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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiff/Appellant Advanced Explosives Demolition, Inc., (A ED") and

Defendant/Respondent KDC Investments, LLC, ("KDC") entered into an agreement for KDC to
purchase a bridge from AED (the "Sales Agreement") and for AED to perform part of the
demolition work to remove the bridge (the "Blasting Agreement"). The parties reduced their
agreement to two separate writings. KDC paid the purchase price for the bridge, but refused to
honor the Blasting Agreement.
AED filed suit seeking to rescind the Sales Agreement on the grounds that KDC
fraudulently induced AED into selling KDC the bridge by contracting AED to do the blasting
work when KDC had no intention of honoring that commitment. AED also filed suit for breach
of the Blasting Agreement. KDC denied the parties had entered into the Blasting Agreement
and. alleged, amongst other things, that the Blasting Agreement was illegal because AED did not
have a contractor's license.
B.

Proceedings Below
KDC brought a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to preliminarily enforce the

Sales Agreement. The District Court denied the motion and in the process ruled the AED was
not entitled to rescission because it had not made a proper tender of consideration to KDC.
KDC brought a motion for summary judgment on various grounds. The District Court
ruled that 1) that the Blasting Agreement was iUegal2) and because it was illegal. AED could
not rely on it in its fraud claim and 3) AED had provided no proof that KDC did not intend to
perform the Blasting Agreement when it signed the Blasting Agreement. The District Court then
quieted title of the bridge to KDC and dismissed AED's breach of contract claims.

On reconsideration, AED pointed out that AED's allegation is that the Blasting
Agreement was material to the Sales Agreement and if the Blasting Agreement was illegal, the
Sales Agreement was not enforceable or at least a question of fact existed in that regard. The
District Court resolved the factual question in favor of KDC and denied the motion to reconsider.

C.

Facts
In 2009. AED purchased the Bellaire Bridge. The Bellaire Bridge was the subject of a

Court Order for its removal (R.468

~3).

While AED was finalizing its purehase of the bridge,

Eric Kelly on behalf of AED was simultaneously negotiating the sale of the bridge to KDC, who
was acting through Lee and Krystal Chaklos (R.469 ~~8-1 0). Lee Chaklos owned Delta
Demolition. KDC was going to hire Delta Demolition to remove the bridge, and Delta was
going to hire AED to perform the blasting pursuant to the terms of the Blasting Agreement.
AED had reservations about selling the bridge due to the fact that AED was ultimately
responsible for the removal of the bridge to both the seller of the bridge and the COllli which had
Ordered its removal (R.469 ~9). However, AED believed that KDC could properly accomplish
the removal of the bridge provided AED was involved in the project (R.469

~l

0).

On January 14, 20 10, Eric Kelly on behalf of AED and Lee Chaklos on behalf of KDC
exchanged an e-mail where the parties agreed to all the material terms of the agreements. AED,
the parties agreed, would purchase the bridge, and then sell it to Delta Group (referring to Lee
Chaklos' company Delta Demolition) for $25,000 who would then hire AED to blast the steel
superstructure for $175,000 (R. 470 'rill, R.476 - 478).
On May 19,20 10, Eric Kelly sent Krystal Chaklos an e-mail which set forth the terms for
the Blasting Agreement between AED and Delta Demolition (R.4 70 ,: 12, R.4 79- 481). The
following day, Krystal Chaklos returned the Sales Agreement for the bridge accompanied by a
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fax cover sheet indicating that she looked forward to working with AED on the blasting work (R.
4 70 ~13, R.482- 483).
The Sales Agreement required KDC to pay $25,000 upon execution of the agreement.
On May 20, 20 10, the parties executed a document entitled "Letter of Contingency". which
provided:
To all, bear witness this 20 th day of May 2010, that the parties
identified as Advanced Explosives, Inc., (AED) and KDC
Investments, LLC, hereby agree, in whole and part, that the
purchase money will be conveyed to AED no later than the 25 th
day of May, 2010, via wire transfer.
th

It is also agreed that if such money is not recorded by the 26 day
of May, 20 10, any and all previoLls agreements are null and void
(R.225).
The purchase money for the bridge was not paid on May 25 th (R.4 71 '[15). On May 2ih, AED
informed KDC the agreement was tcrminated because the purchase money was not paid (R.4 71
~ 16),

R.484- 486).
Notwithstanding the fact that the Sales Agreement was null and void, AED and KDC

continued to negotiate regarding the sale and demoli tion of the bridge. On June 1, 20 10, via email, AED again reiterated the requirement that KDC hire AED to blast the bridge and proposed
to sell the bridge to KDC under the same terms and conditions as the prior now void Sales
Agreement. AED specifically required the execution of the Blasting Contract. Krystal Chaklos
responded, "You have my word that AED will do the blast as long as you are still receptive to
doing ... Krystal." (R.471

~18,

R.487- 489). The same day, KDC and AED executed a contract

for AED to blast the bridge (R.47l - 4 72 ~19, R.490 - 499). The purchase money of $25,000 for
the sale of the bridge was paid on June 3, 2010.
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The Blasting Agreement required KDC to pay $30,000 to AED on or before June 9,
2010, which KDC did not pay (RA72 fl20). After June 9 th , AED continued in good faith to
fulfill its obligations pursuant to the parties' bargain, notwithstanding the fact that KDC had for
the second time breached the agreement. AED incurred time and expenses, including the
purchase of the explosives for the job which had been custom cut for the project (RA72 ~22).
On June 14

th

,

AED inquired regarding payment and informed KDC that AED would not

be going any further unless AED received payment pursuant to the parties' written agreement
(RA72 '123, R.S02 - S03). In that same e-mail, Kelly informed KDC that it would take about

two days to obtain a West Virginia contractor's license in response to KDC's continued
mentioning that AED needed that license. It took three days to obtain said contractor's license
(R.S18 flS) and it was obtained on October 17, 2010. (R.699)
On June 16 th , Kelly and Lee Chaklos had another discussion about the failure of KDC to
pay the $30,000 as required by the Blasting Agreement (R.472 fl24).

During that exchange, Lee

Chaklos offered to sell the bridge back to AED for $2S,000. Later that day, Krystal Chaklos sent

Kelly an e-mail stating that the price to buy the bridge back was the amount of the Blast
Agreement -- $175,000 (R.473 fl25). Then later, Krystal Cbaklos sent Eric Kelly an e-mail that
AED would be paid when Delta had received the City of Benwood's permit to proceed eR.4 73
~26,

R.S04

S08). This e-mail also emphasized that AED would need a West Virginia

contractor's license.
On June 18

th

,

AED responded in writing to Krystal Chaklos' e-mail regarding KDC's

failure to pay based on permitting and informed her that permitting was not a condition
precedent to payment. AED further stated through Eric Kelly, "according to US Federal and
State of West Virginia law, there is no requirement for a WESTE VIGRINIA CONTRACTORS
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LICENCE (Sic in order to enter into a contractual agreement between two parties." AED further
informed her necessary permitting would be in place by the time AED had to perform under the
parties' agreement (R.473 ~27, R.509 - 511). On June 29t\ AED informed Krystal Chaklos that
AED stood ready, willing, and able to perform (R.473
On July

~28,

R.512 - 514).

i\ AED involved its counsel who wrote to Krystal Chaklos and demanded

either that the deposit be wired or suit would be filed (R.453 - 455). The response to that
demand was that KDC had discussed the proposal with its counsel and that KDC was not in
breach of the proposal because AED was not qualified to do the job.

Counsel for AED then

demanded that KDC identify in what respect AED was not qualified to do the job, and the
response was that AED had not, " ... conveyed the proper paperwork for qualification," and that
AED and Kelly were well aware of the required paperwork, but the "required paperwork" was
still left undefined (R.456 - 459). KDC also repudiated its obligation to go forward with the
Blasting Agreement.
On July 13 th , counsel for KDC wrote a letter to counsel for AED taking the position that
the Blasting Agreement was not a contract, and alleged KDC had not signed it and that even if it
was a contract, AED had breached it because AED did not have a West Virginia contractor's
license and, " ... did not meet other various licensing and permit requirements," but again the
requirements were left unidentified. Furthermore, KDC now took the position that AED did not
have proper insurance. (R.543 ~2, R.547). Additionally, on July 13 th , AED offered to return
KDC's purchase money for the bridge (R.473

~29,

R.515 - 516).

On July 21 st, counsel for AED spoke with counsel for KDC and asked him to identify
what licensing requirements were missing and still no additional information was provided.
(R.544 ~3-5). Thereafter, AED commenced this action.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court error in determining that the Blasting Agreement was
illegal and void because AED did not have a West Virginia Contractor's License
at the time of the making of the agreement?

II.

Did the District Court error by enforcing the Sales Agreement even though a
material question of fact existed as to whether the Blasting Agreement could be
severed from the Sales Agreement?

III.

Did the District Court error by holding that AED could not seek rescission
because AED had not made a proper tender of KDC's consideration?

IV.

Did the District Court error by dismissing AED's claim of fraudulent
inducement on summary judgment based on a lack of evidence?

V.

Did the District Court error by striking certain portions of AED's affidavits filed
in opposition to summary Judgment.

VI.

Is AED entitled to attorneys fees on appeal?
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE FAILURE TO HAVE A CONTRACTOR'S LICENSE AT THE TIME OF CONTRACTING DOES
NOT RENDER AN EXECUTORY AGREEMENT TO PERFORM CONSTRUCTION WORK
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE CONTRACTOR CAN RECOVER FOR WORK PERFORMED
AFTER OBTAINING PROPER LICENSING.

The District Court allowed KDC to avoid its obligation under the Blasting Agreement
because AED had not obtained a West Virginia Contractor's license at the time of entering into
the agreement. This was in error because under Idaho or West Virginia Law l , an executory
contract for construction work cannot be avoided on the grounds that the contract lacks the
proper licensing in Idaho or West Virginia.
Even if this Court determines that the failure to have a license is a defense to enforcement
of an executory contract for construction work, as soon as the contractor obtains the proper
licensing, then the contract can no longer be avoided. AED had the proper licensing at the time
the Court declared the contract to be illegal and that fact rendered the Blasting Agreement
enforceable.
KDC argued and the District Court agreed the contract was illegal on the basis that AED
did not have a West Virginia contractor's license at the time it entered into the Blasting
Agreement. (R. 914). The District Court determined the facts of this case to be similar to Barry
v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004), where the Idaho Supreme
Court determined that the agreement in question was illegal. (R. 700). The agreement in Barry
which was deemed illegal was the agreement to intentionally avoid the requirements of the Idaho
Public Works Contractor Licensing Act. "On March 8, Jack asked Barry if Quality had a public
works license. Barry acknowledged that it did not. Jack stated that Quality would have to

J West Virginia's Supreme Court has specially held that the failure of the contractor to have proper licensing is not a
defense to action for payment by the contractor. Timber Ridge. Inc. v. Hunt Country Asphalt & Paving. LLC
222W.Va. 784, 789, 671 S.E.2d. 789, 794 (W.Va 2008)
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continue its work as Pac-West employees. Barry agreed and advised his employees of the
arrangement. Quality continued its work under the umbrella ofPac-West's public works
license." Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 830, 103 P.3d 440,443 (2004)
(emphasis supplied). Quality/Barry was a subcontractor and was required to have a public works
contractor's license. The agreement in that case was that Quality would continue to work on the
project without the required license. That is an agreement to intentionally violate the public
works contractor registration requirements, an illegal act, and was properly declared to be an
unenforceable agreement.
Unlike Barry, the agreement here does not contemplate AED perform any illegal act and
specifically requires AED to obtain proper licensing. The District Court acknowledged that, "At
the time of actual performance of this executory contract, it is likely that AED could have had, or
perhaps even would have had, any necessary licensing/registration to perform the contract as
agreed upon by the parties," but then invalidated the contract because AED did not have a
license at the time it entered into the agreement. (R.914). This is in error because in neither
West Virginia nor Idaho, the failure of the contractor to have a license at contract formation does
not render an executory contract illegal and unenforceable. In Idaho, the contractor can collect
for work performed only while the contractor was properly licensed, even if the contractor was
not licensed at the time of contract formation.
In general, the fact that a license might have to be obtained before the work is performed
does not render a contract illegal.
Many contracts cannot lawfully be performed without securing a
permit, license, or approval from some governmental officer or
board, and yet the contracts are not deemed illegal.
Professor Williston says, 'The fact that a party bargains to do an
act which will be illegal unless governmental permission is
8

obtained does not make such bargain illegal, and if he does not
obtain such permission he is responsible in damages for failure to
perform.'
Magruder v. Hagen-Ratcliff & Co. 131
W.Va. 679, 685-686, 50 S.E.2d 488,492 493 (W. Va.1948) citing Nusenbaum v.
Chambers & Chambers, 322 Mass. 419, 77
N.E.2d 780, 782 (Mass. 1948) citing
Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.) § 1767,
note 3.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that licensing obtained after the
construction agreement was entered into validates an otherwise unenforceable agreement.
In Park West Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), the District
Court determined the contract to be "void" because the contractor was not registered at the time
the contractor signed the contract. The contractor in that case did not challenge this finding on
appeal so the Supreme Court did not address that issue. (Id. at 608, 208). However, the District
Court also invalidated the contractor's lien. Idaho Code 54-5208 provides that a contractor shall
be allowed a lien if not registered, but the Supreme Court determined that the statute only
prevented a lien for work performed while the contractor was unlicensed, and the contractor
could collect for work performed after the contractor had obtained proper licensing. The
Supreme Court found this interpretation consistent with Idaho Code 54-5217(2) which provides
that a contractor must prove proper licensing" ... at all times during the performance of such act
or contract" in order to maintain an action for payment. (ParkWest at 608, 208). The Supreme
Court specifically found that the work performed by Parkwest while unregistered illegal, but
work done while registered was legal. (rd.) Therefore, the failure of the contractor to be licensed
at the time of contracting does not invalidate the entire agreement on the grounds of illegality.
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Idaho's Contractor Registration Act does not invalidate an executory contractor to
perform construction work if the contractor was unlicensed at the time of contracting, it just
prevents the collection of money earned for work performed without the proper license. If the
failure of the contractor to be licensed at the time of contracting voided the entire transaction, the
Supreme Court in Parkwest could have made that determination sue sponte in that case. Taylor
v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829, 841 (2011), but specifically found that
work performed after licensing was obtained was not illegal. Implicit in this finding is that the
failure of the contractor to be licensed at the time of contracting does not render the agreement
void and unenforceable.
Even if the failure to have a contractor's license is a bar to bringing suit to enforce and
executory contract for construction work, that bar disappeared when AED obtained the West
Virginia Contractor's license which occurred prior to the District COUli's declaration that the
Blasting Agreement was illegal.
The Blasting Agreement is not illegal, but if it is, the Sales Agreement is also illegal and
the District Court should not have enforced it by quieting title to the bridge in KDC.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ENFORCING THE SALES AGREEMENT BECAUSE A
QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER THE BLASTING AGREEMENT WAS
MATERIAL TO THE SALES AGREEMENT AND THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE
SUBMITTED THAT ISSUE TO THE JURY.

The District Court ruled that the promise by KDC to hire AED is illegal, but then
enforced the remainder of the parties' agreement to sell the bridge. If the blasting agreement is
illegal, then the remainder of the agreement is illegal because the blast portion was material to
AED and cannot be separated from the agreement to sell the bridge, or at least a question of fact
exists as to whether the Blast Agreement was material to the Sales Agreement. The District
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Court should not have provided KDC any relief as it is providing affirmative relief to a party to
an illegal agreement.
First, the District Court seemed to take offense to AED's suggestion that if the Blasting
Agreement was iIlegal, so was the Sales Agreement.

The District Court referred to AED's

argument as "creative" and taking "some nerve," (R.911), because AED was suggesting the Blast
Agreement was illegal. AED does not now nor has it ever taken the position that the Blast
Agreement is illegal. As set forth above, the District Court's ruling in this regard in error. AED
was only pointing out to the District Court, as it is to the Appellate Court, that

if the Blasting

Agreement is illegal, the holding had ramifications for the enforceability of the Sales Agreement
because the agreement to sell the bridge was entirely depending on the agreement that AED
would blast the bridge. The District Court should not have enforced the agreement to sell the
bridge because it cannot be severed from the agreement that AED blast the bridge.
If less than all of an agreement is unenforceable under the rule
stated in § 178, a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the
agreement in favor of a party who did not engage in serious
misconduct if the performance as to which the agreement IS
unenforceable is not an essential part of the agreed exchange.
Restatement Second of Contracts
§ 184
Primarily the criterion would appear to be whether the parties
would have entered into the agreement irrespective of the
offending provisions of the contract.
This can usually be
determined by weighing equality of the agreed exchange before
and after the proposed severance.
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts,
Third Edition 1987 at 893, citing
Marsh, the Severance of Illegality in
Contracts (pts 1 & 2) 64 L.Q.Rev.
230, 347 (1948) and Restatement
11

Second of Contracts, Section 184,
Comment a.
Whether the Blasting Agreement was an "essential part of the agreed exchange" is a
question of materiality and a question of fact for the jury. "It is well established that materiality
is a question of fact for the trial court, ... " Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall
Associates, 122 Idaho 261, 267,833 P.2d 119, 125 (Ct. App.1992).
In this case, the District Court improperly choose to resolve this question of fact in favor
of KDC based on the District Court's construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
KDC. This was error and the evidence before the District Court clearly establishes that AED
would not have sold the bridge to KDC but for the fact that KDC hired AED to blast the bridge.
The District Court's factual determination that the Blasting Agreement was not material
to the agreement to sell the bridge rests heavily on the District Court's factual finding that the
Blast Agreement and Sales Agreement were entered into at different times.
Had the illegal demolition agreement been entered into before the
purchase agreement, then there might be more to AED's argument.
But here, the demolition agreement did not even exist at the time
the purchase agreement was entered into. CR. 910-911)
Nonetheless, because the two agreements in the instant matter are
dated over three weeks apart, and the two agreements in Quiring
occurred simultaneously, Quiring is simply not instructive.
(R.917)
The purchase agreement was entered into eleven days before the
demolition agreement. .. (R.907)
This Court has not determined the purchase agreement to be
illegal, and there is simply nothing before the Court (other than
Eric Kelly's arguably self-serving affidavit) to indicate that the
demolition agreement was to form a portion of the consideration
supporting the purchase agreement, which was entered into more
than one week prior to the demolition agreement and makes no
reference to it. (R.919)
12

This Court would have to Ignore the fact that the purchase
agreement
was
entered
into
before
the
demolition
agreement, ... (R. 910)
The District Court's finding that the Sales Agreement was entered into before the
Blasting Agreement is contradicted by the evidence. The Sale Agreement was entered into on
May 20,2010, and then rendered void by the fact that KDC did not pay the $25,000 by May 26,
2010. (RA 71). AED proposed to again sell the bridge under the same terms and conditions as

the May 20, 2010, agreement, if and only if KDC executed the Blasting Agreement. In the
face of this conflicting evidence, it was error for the District Court to resolve the question of fact
as to when the Blasting Agreement was entered into in favor of KDC. The Sales Agreement
signed May 20, 2010, had no life at the time the Blasting Agreement was signed and only came
into existence because that Blasting Agreement was signed. It was in error for the District Court
to conclude otherwise, and when the Sales Agreement and Blasting Agreement came into
existence is at least a question of fact for the jury.
Other evidence proves that AED would not have sold the bridge but for the promise that
it be allowed to blast the bridge. AED was ultimately responsible for the demolition and
removal of the bridge and it wished to be involved to be sure it was properly handled. (RA674 70 ~9-1 0). To sell the bridge for $25,000, and no other consideration would have been
"stupid." (R.821, p.121, In.3-12). KDC did in fact execute a document for AED to perform the
blasting work and has clearly stated that it had a present intent to perform that obligation incident
to the agreement to buy the bridge. (RA02).
Furthermore, the consideration for the Sales Agreement to purchase the bridge was only
$25,000. (R.299). AED expected to make approximately $80,0000 from the Blasting
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Agreement. (R.493, and 671).2 The majority of the consideration which KDC provided to AED
for this transaction was to come from the Basting Agreement.
The evidence before the District Court was more than sufficient to show that the Blasting
Agreement was an essential part of the agreed upon consideration for the exchange of the bridge.
It was error, therefore, for the District Court to resolve that factual issue in favor ofKDC and

enforce the sale, even though the Blasting Agreement was "illegal."
In the event this Court does not reverse the District Court's determination that the Blast
Agreement was illegal, then this Court should remand this matter to the District Court with
instructions to submit the jury the issue of whether the Blast Agreement can be separated from
the Sales Agreement - i.e., if the Blast Agreement was essential to Sales Agreement rending one
unenforceable without the other.

III.

AED WAS NOT REQUIRED TO TENDER THE $25,000 TO KDC PRIOR TO FILING SUIT IN
ORDER TO SEEK RESCISSION BECAUSE THE LACK OF A PROPER TENDER DOES NOTHING
TO DIMINISH THE EQUITABLE POWER OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT RESCISSION.

The District Court ruled that AED could not seek rescission of the parties' agreement
because AED failed to tender the $25,000 to KDC it had been paid. This is in error because
AED was not seeking rescission based on an agreement to rescind, but was seeking an equitable
rescission based on KDC' s breach of the parties' agreement. The former requires a proper tender
and the later does not.
O'Connor v. Harger Construction Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3 rd 846 (2008) is the most
recent case to discuss the distinction between an action to enforce an agreement to rescind and an
action for an equitable rescission. In that case, Harger, the contractor, was granted rescission by
the Trial Court. O'Connor, the home owner, argued that Harger was not entitled to rescission

2

$175,000 blast contract amount less the $95,000 for estimated costs from Eric Kelly's Affidavit.
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because Harger had not tendered O'Connor's deposit to her prior to suit. The Supreme Court
stated,
Whether Harger's April 2005 letter constitutes a valid tender of
O'Connor's deposit. and whether rescission as an equitable remedy
is available are two separate issues. Once O'Connor flIed suit for
breach of contract against Harger, Harger was relieved of his duty
to tender O'Connor's deposit, constituting a valid rescission, absent
a court order.
Whether Harger completed a valid tender, making reSCISSIOn
outside of court proper does nothing to reduce the equitable powers
of the trial court. The district court, in this case was free to fashion
an equitable remedy as it saw fit. Therefore it is not necessary for
this Court to determine the sufficiency of Harger's tender in this
case.
O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc. 145
Idaho 904, 912,188 P.3d 846,
854 (2008)
The Supreme Court was pointing out that an agreement to rescind is a separate legal action and
that to enforce the agreement to rescind, a proper tender must me shown. A legal rescission,
which requires a showing of actual tender, is accomplished by a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract to terminate their agreement.
Mutual assent may be by offer to rescind and acceptance by the
other party, but the offer on the one side must be accepted on the
other, before its withdrawal, and one party to a contract cannot
abrogate or rescind it by merely giving notice to the other of its
intention so to do. However, where a party, even without right,
claims to rescind a contract, if the other party agrees to the
rescission or does not object thereto and permits it to be rescinded,
the rescission is by mutual consent."
Lowe
v.
Lyrn,
259,262,646 P.2d
(Ct.App.1982) citing
Contracts s 389, at 466
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103
Idaho
1030, 1033
17 A C.l.S.
(1963).

If an agreement to rescind is not reached and one of the parties goes to Court seeking rescission,
tender is not required. An offer of tender is required, and that occurred in this case.
"A party seeking to rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud must restore or offer to
restore the other party to the status quo before the contract was formed." Watson v. Weick,

141 Idaho 500, 507,112 P.3d 788, 795 (2005) citing White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,104 P.3d
356 (2004); Haener v. Albro, 73 Idaho 250, 249 P.2d 919 (1952). Also see Lithocraft, Inc. v.
Rocky Mountain Marketing, 108 Idaho 247, 248, 697 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Ct.App.1985) - "It is
well-established that he who seeks equity must first do equity; he who seeks equitable rescission
must first tender or offer to tender that which he has received" (emphasis supplied).
When a party is seeking a judgment for rescission, an offer to tender is all that is required
and such was made in this case. On July 13,2010, AED informed KDC it was their last chance
to accept the return of their money. (R.516). That is an offer to return the consideration
provided and sufficient to allow AED to seek rescission.
Also see Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educational Community, 435 Mich. 155,208,458
N.W.2d 56,80 (Mich.1990).
The chancellor had the power to cancel or rescind a contract. A
person could, therefore, bring an action seeking cancellation of
a contract or release, as distinguished from an action claiming
that the contract or release had been rescinded. This Court
said:
"It is said that plaintiff neither restored
nor offered to restore to defendant the
property
received
before
seeking
rescission. Neither was necessary. A bill in
equity praying rescission proceeds on a
theory that there has been no rescission,
not on the theory that rescission has
already been accomplished." Witte v.
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Hobolth. 224 Mich. 286, 290, 195 N.W.
82 (1923). (Emphasis added.)
IV.

WHETHER KDC ENTERED INTO THE BLAST AGREEMENT WITH AED WITH NO INTENT

OF PERFORMING THAT AGREEMENT AND SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING AED TO
SELL KDC THE BRIDGE IS A QUESTION OF FACT.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO

DISMISS ON SUMMARY AED's CLAIM THAT IT WAS FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED INTO SELLING
THE BRIDGE.

The Trial Court dismissed AED's claim that it was fraudulently induced into selling the
bridge to KDC because AED had, " ... shown nothing that demonstrates KDC never intended to
permit AED to demolish the bridge on the date the demolition agreement was entered into."
The question of fraudulent inducement is a question of fact and the facts and circumstances
surrounding KDC's breach of the blasting agreement strongly suggest that KDC never intended
to honor that agreement.
Generally, the mere failure to perform an agreement cannot support a finding of fraud.
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671, 673-674,132 P.3d 428, 430431 (2006). "One exception is if the speaker made the promise without any intent to keep it, but
to induce action on the part of the promisee." Id citing Pocatello Sec. Trust Co. v. Henry, 35
Idaho 321, 206 P. 175 (1922). "False representations as to future events will constitute fraud,
where these events depend upon the acts of the party making the representations, and form the
inducement whereby the other patty is led into the transaction." Pocatello Security Trust Co. v.
Henry, 206 P. 175, 177 (1922) citing Henderson v. San Antonio, etc. R. Co., 17 Tex. 560,67
Am. Dec. 675.
Fraudulent inducement is a question of fact. "Thus, even assuming the district court
concluded that these actions amount to fraud in the inducement, there are factual disagreements
about the understanding and intent of each party to the deed of trust and promissory note,
precluding summary judgment. Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223-224, 220 P.3d 575,579
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- 580 (2009). Fraudulent inducement by definition can only be proved by circumstantial
evidence because the only direct evidence can come from the person accused of making a
promise with no intent to keep it, who is unlikely to admit the same.
Evidence of fraudulent inducement is can be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Progressive Ins. Co. v. Wasoka, 178 Vt. 337, 372, 885 A.2d 1166, 1192 (Vt.2005); The party
accused of fraud is almost always going to say that it had the present intent to fulfill the contract,
but the circumstances surrounding that party's breach or repudiation of the agreement create the
question of fact as to whether the party ever intended to fulfill that promise. "But while breach
alone is no evidence of fraudulent intent, breach combined with "slight circumstantial evidence"
of fraud is enough to support a verdict for fraudulent inducement." Tony Gullo Motors 1, L.P. v.
Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299,305 (Tex.2006).
As should be expected, Krystal Chaklos maintains that KDC company had the present
intention to perform the parties blasting work at the time she signed the proposed blasting
proposal. (RA02

~~7).

KDC's conduct belies that assertion.

KDC signed the blasting proposal on June 1,2010. (RA93). KDC was to pay AED
$30,000 on June 9,2010. (Id). On June 14,2010, AED wrote Krystal Chaklos and informed her
that AED was obtaining the necessary licenses to be a sub-contractor in the State of West
Virginia. AED also requested the June 9, 2010, installment be paid. (R.503). Then on June 16,
Eric Kelly of AED spoke with Lee Chaklos, Krystal's husband, about the late $30,000
installment, (RA27, pp24), and later that evening Krystal Chaklos offered to sell the bridge back
to AED for $175,000, (R.505), the amount of the Blasting Contract, a profit of $150,000 for
KDC.
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The same day of the $175,000 offer, Krystal Chaklos tells AED it will need a West
Virginia Contractors license, but does not state that is why KDC is withholding payment.
(R.507). KDC says that AED will get paid when Delta, a different company, obtains the City of
Benwoods permit to proceed. (ld). The blasting agreement contains no condition precedent to
the payment of the $30,000 deposit and no reasonable person could interpret it in that way.
AED continued to work with KDC to get paid to no avail and on July

i\ later in the day,

counsel for AED writes to KDC and informed KDC that, "The contract to demolish the bridge
provides, without condition, that you were to pay $30,000 by June 9, 2010, which you have not
done." (RA54). The response from KDC was that Mr. Kelly was not qualified to do the job at
the time and that no funds would be conveyed until Mr. Kelly was qualified and a contract is
drafted and notarized for blasting. (RA50).
AED requested that KDC, " ... provide your explanation as to why he is not qualified, or
provide the name of your attorney so I may contact him or her directly." (RA58). In response,
KDC was to neither provide an explanation nor to provide the name of counsel, but to just
terminate the Blasting Agreement. (ld).
KDC immediately and without any justification contained in the Blasting Agreement
breached the Blasting Agreement, and then attempted to sell the bridge back to AED at a
$150,000 profit. This was sufficient evidence, " ... upon which a jury could reasonably return a
verdict ... " that KDC had no present intention of honoring the Blasting Agreement contract when
it signed it and only did so to indicate AED to go forward with the Sales Agreement. Brown v.
City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806,229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010) citing Harpole v. State, 131
Idaho 437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). It was error for the District Court to resolve this
disputed issue of fact in favor of KDC on summary judgment.
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY STRUCK PORTION OF AED's AFFIDAVIT'S

SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The District Court improperly struck portions of AED's affidavits submitted in
opposition to summary judgment. The decision to admit evidence at summary judgment is
within the discretion of the trial court. J-U-B Engineers. Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford 146
Idaho 311, 314-15,193 P.3d 858, 861-62 (2008). The District Court abused its discretion in
excluding certain portions of AED's affidavits filed in opposition to summary judgment.

a.

Eric Kelly's Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
1. Paragraph 10.

The District Court without any explanation struck this paragraph on the grounds that it
was speculative, not based upon personal knowledge and lack of foundation.
I believed, and still do believe, that with AED's assistance, the
Chaklos can properly demolish the bridge which is why I agreed to

go forward with the Chaklos. This would provide for a quicker return
to AED and would keep AED in the loop during the demolition
process to make sure it was aware of the status of the contingent
liability of AED to Barrack to assure proper removal of the bridge. In
addition, it would bring all my years of experience, and the attendant
business and agency contact I have developed, to the demolition
project. The Chaklos recognized this fact and requested that I attend a
meeting with the Benwood City Counsel to assist Delta in obtaining
the permits Delta needed to obtain. I complied and drove all the way
to Ohio to this meeting two days before KDC's first installment on the
blasting contract was due.
This paragraph is not speculative as it is describing why it was material to AED that AED
perform the blasting work if it was going to sell the bridge and can only be based on the personal
knowledge of Eric Kelly. What foundation would be required for an explanation as to why
something was or was not material is unknown. It was error to strike this paragraph.
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2. Paragraph 9.

The District Court struck paragraph 9 on the grounds that it stated a legal conclusion.
The only thing that could be considered a legal conclusion is the statement that AED was
ultimately responsible for removal of the bridge.
AED was reluctant to sell the bridge to the Chaklos, or to any party
for that matter, because of AED's ultimate responsibility to assure
the removal of the bridge. I also did not know the Chaklos and was
unaware of their competence at demolition or the financial ability
of them to properly demolish the bridge.
The statement was offered not as a legal conclusion, but as a statement of AED's belief
that I was legally responsible to remove the bridge and is relevant to why AED blasting the
bridge was material to AED' s agreement to sell the bridge.
3. Paragraph 20.

The District Court without any explanation struck this paragraph on the grounds that it
was speculative, not based upon personal knowledge and lack of foundation
The paragraphs states:
The demolition agreement required KDC to pay $30,000 on or
before June 9, 2010. The PSA also required that KDC substitute
itself as the real party in interest into the federal court case. KDC
did not deposit payment on the 9th as required by the purchase and
sale agreement and refused to take the steps necessary to substitute
itself into the federal court lawsuit when I told them they needed to
get that accomplished. (See Exhibit "G" attached hereto and
incorporated herein.)
Eric Kelly's affidavit recites that it is based on personal knowledge so the statement what
KDC was to pay and did not pay the $30,000 deposit is supported by foundation. It is likewise
not speculative as it is a fact that that Blasting Agreement requires it and KDC has not denied
that it was not paid.
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4. Paragraph 30, 31, and 33.

30.
In light of the business practices ofKDC and the Chaklos, I
am very concerned that if this Court should continue to rule that
AED cannot rescind the agreement, that the Chaklos will cause
KDC or Delta to borrow money and secure it with the scrap steel
from the bridge. Lee Chaklos asked me directly to assist him with
this process in the past.
31.
Given that KDC has no independent financial ability to
demolish the bridge, if AED is left to just seek an award of
damages, any judgment AED obtains will be second in time to any
loan the Chaklos have received against the steel in the bridge. This
will make AED's judgment difficult to collect and will further
create the risk that KDC will obtain the only value in the bridge the steel spans - and leave the main cost of the bridge - the removal
of the piers - for AED to deal with.
33.
I have serious concerns about any plan to demolish the
bridge without blasting the spans. As my engineer expert's report
states, such a plan would creates additional expense as well as risk
associated with the demolition and removal of the bridge.
These paragraphs further explain why AED is concerned about not being involved in the
demolition process. The information is based on the personal knowledge of Eric Kelly and no
further foundation is required to admit AED's explanation for why the Blasting Agreement was
material to the Sales Agreement.
b.

Mark Wilburn Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment.

The District Court struck the Affidavit of Mark Wilburn on the grounds of a lack of
foundation because it did not mention a date. (R.696) This was error because the District Court
relied on the affidavit in ruling on summary judgment and the affidavit does set forth the date the
application for the West Virginia Contractor's License was received by AED.
Wilburn's affidavit establishes that took three days to obtain a West Virginia Contractors
License. Since the District Court determined that the license was likely obtained on October 17,
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2010, then the date upon which the application was received was established as October 14,2010
and it was error to strike that affidavit on the grounds that it did not set forth a date.
The District Court determined all the information in the affidavits for be relevant to the
motion for summary judgment. (R.694). It was an abuse of discretion to exclude the portions of
the affidavits on the grounds above recited and, on appeal, this Court should consider those
portions of the affidavits which the District Court should not have excluded.
VI.

AED IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES ON ApPEAL.

AED is entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 12120(3). The parties' agreement pertains to the sale and demolition of a bridge and is, therefore, a
commercial transaction because it is not for personal or household purposes. Garner v. Povey,
259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
The Blasting Contract is not illegal and unenforceable because AED did not have a valid
contractor's license at the time of contracting with KDC to perform that work. If it was illegal,
that illegality was remedied by AED obtaining the license on October 17, 2010, well before the
District Court ruled the contract illegal. The Blasting Agreement was legal. but if it was not, it
was a question of fact as to whether the Sales Agreement was enforceable, as the evidence
clearly shows that the Sales Agreement would not exist without the Blasting Agreement.
AED requests that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling that the Blasting
Agreement is illegal and the dismissal of AED claims for fraudulent inducement and the Order
quieting title to the bridge in KDC, and remand the matter to the District Court for proceedings
consistent herewith.
Alternatively, and in the event this Court determines the Blasting Agreement to be illegal,
AED requests that this Court reverse the District Court's determination that that Blasting
Agreement can be severed from the Sales Agreement and remand the matter with instruction to
submit that issue to the jury.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of December, 2011.

Arthur M. Bistline
Attorney for Appellant
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